In pharmaceuticals markets, sellers of branded drugs sometimes sell generic versions of their own branded products, either directly or through license agreements. Although claims that these pseudo-generics may have anti-competitive effects are not unusual, the theoretical literature on this issue is limited and not conclusive. This paper uses a model that combines horizontal and vertical product differentiation, to explain how those effects may occur. We show that the producer of the branded product will not sell the pseudo-generic unless faced with competition and that, if she does so, in some circumstances, all prices rise to the benefit of all sellers and the detriment of consumers.
Introduction
In recent decades, generics became an important competitive force in pharmaceutical markets, gaining considerable market share from branded products. Generics, according to the US Food and Drug Administration, "(...) are copies of brand-name drugs and are the same as those brand name drugs in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics and intended use". 1 Generics may enter the market if a patent-holder waives its rights or, more often, when the patents that protect a branded product expire. As imitators, generic producers do not incur significant research and development costs and are able to charge very competitive prices.
It has been observed that, sometimes, the producer of a branded pharmaceutical will sell a generic version of its own branded product, either directly or through license agreements. 2 These versions are often known in the literature as pseudogenerics. The competitive impact of pseudo-generics is not obvious. On one hand, they increase the low-cost alternatives available to consumers. But on the other hand, it is not implausible that they have some type of strategic impact on other generic competitors that may hurt consumers.
The theoretical literature on the competitive implications of pseudo-generics is rather limited and not conclusive. Ferrándiz (1999) presents a model in which the incumbent seller of a branded drug competes against another imperfectly substitutable branded drug under two alternative scenarios: in one of the scenarios, a third firm sells a generic version of its branded drug; in the other scenario, the third firm does not exist but the incumbent itself sells a pseudo-generic. Unsurprisingly, this author concludes that the incumbent prefers to sell a pseudo-generic itself rather than facing competition by an independent generic producer, although this would be better for consumers. Kamien and Zang (1999) assume that, when patents for branded drugs expire, there is free generic entry. They build scenarios with and without pseudo-generics to study the conditions under which incumbents would prefer to sell them and conclude that selling pseudo-generics is a dominant strategy. But these authors assume that the type of interaction between the brand-name producer and its competitors depends on whether the former is selling a pseudogeneric: if she is not, all firms choose quantities simultaneously (Cournot) but if she is, then she has a first-mover advantage towards the competitors in choosing the quantities of both the branded drug and the pseudo-generic (Stackelberg). We find this crucial assumption unconvincing and feel it casts doubt on the generality of their conclusions: why would selling the pseudo-generic determine whether the firm has a first-mover advantage in selling the branded drug? Kong and Seldon (2004) have tried to rationalize pseudo-generics as an instrument to deter entry, in a model a la Dixit (1979) , but their results seem flawed (Rodrigues 2006) . Entry deterrence is also the motivation for pseudo-generic production in a limit-price model proposed by Granier and Trinquard (2010) . More recently, the same authors (Granier and Trinquard 2012) explore the possibility that pseudo-generic production may be used by brand-name producers to reduce the value of their generic competitors and thus facilitate their acquisition. Generally, pseudo-generics are sold side-by-side with generic and branded versions of the same drug. Models of entry deterrence (or merger to monopoly) seem unable to explain this. The new theoretical rationale for the potential anticompetitive effects of pseudo-generics advanced in this paper is based on entry accommodation, not entry deterrence, and thus seems more apt to explain the simultaneous presence in the market of different varieties of a drug.
In our model, firms are price-setters in a market where both vertical and horizontal differentiation are present: branded pharmaceuticals are vertically differentiated towards generics, and generics are horizontally differentiated among themselves. Vertical differentiation translates consumers' common perception of branded pharmaceuticals as better, or safer, than generics as a result of their prolonged presence in the market while under patent. And, as we argue more extensively below, horizontal differentiation among generics is a plausible assumption if they differ in observable dimensions (e.g. flavour, shape or identity of producer) other than their active substances. A consumer considering switching between the true generic and the pseudo-generic will trade-off any reduction in price against the loss due to horizontal differentiation. No such trade-off exists if he switches between the true generic and the branded pharmaceutical, as this is of better quality. Thus, a reduction in the price of the branded product will attract more consumers away from generic competitors than an equal reduction in the price of the pseudo-generic: therefore, the former price reduction can be profitable even if the latter would not. This is the intuition behind our results. If the pseudo-generic does not exist, the branded pharmaceutical will compete head-to-head with the true generic. But, if the pseudo-generic exists, in equilibrium, it will be perceived by consumers as an "intermediate" product between the generic and the branded product: in that situation, the pseudo-generic, not the branded product, competes directly against the true generic. Because pseudo-generic price reductions are less successful in "stealing" consumers away from the true generic than equivalent reductions in the price of the branded pharmaceutical in the absence of a pseudo-generic, the incumbent now has an incentive to set higher prices. This incentive is compounded by the fact that lowering the price of the pseudogeneric does not only "steal" market share away from the generic producer but also from the incumbent's own, more profitable, branded product. Thus, the presence of the pseudo-generic can reduce the incentive for the incumbent to charge low prices. And prices being strategic complements, the generic producer's incentive to charge low prices is also reduced. In this setting, the presence of pseudo-generics may result in higher prices for every variety of the product, to consumers detriment.
Our model is built on a Hotelling-type framework that gives it some resemblance to spatial preemption models, as those pioneered by Hay (1976) and Schmalensee (1978) and then developed by many others. The resemblance is superficial, however. In the typical spatial preemption model, scale economies require entrants to achieve a minimum market share in order to be profitable. If the incumbents can commit to certain courses of action (not to change location, not to exit, etc.), they may then be able to "block" entry by making it impossible for the entrants to achieve the required market share even if they are earning a profit themselves. This is not the type of mechanism at work in our model and to make it absolutely clear we make the extreme assumption that firms have no costs: our model focuses on the possibility that pseudo-generics may be used to "soften" competition, not on their entry-deterring properties. This is not to say, of course, that pseudo-generics may not be used for that purpose, as well.
The Hotelling framework might also suggest a price-discrimination argument to explain our results: by offering a second variety of the product, the incumbent would "get closer" to consumers and be able to charge higher prices. But, this is not, also, the mechanism at work here. Neither is it simply that a multi-product monopolist has an incentive to charge higher prices than independent monopolists that sells the same products, as in Tirole's (1988) textbook. The vertical differentiation element in our model invalidates these arguments, as can be seen from the results of Section 3: absent competition, the incumbent would not sell the pseudo-generic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our model. For benchmark purposes, in Section 3 we apply it in a monopoly situation. In the fourth section, we analyze oligopolistic competition under two alternative scenarios: with and without the pseudo-generic. Section 5 builds on previous results to determine the competitive impact of the pseudo-generic. We then discuss our results and conclude.
The model
In our model, there are two firms: an incumbent (I) and an entrant (E), indexed by j = I, E. These firms compete by simultaneously setting the prices of the products they sell in conditions of complete information. We thus look for a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. The incumbent sells a certain pharmaceutical product under a specific brand. She can also, if she chooses to, sell a generic, non-branded, variety of the product. The entrant, on the other hand, can only sell a generic variety. Let b (brand) refer to the branded variety of the product, g (generic) to the non-branded variety produced by the entrant, and pg (pseudo-generic) to the non-branded variety produced by the incumbent. Capitalized forms B, PG, and G refer to quantities or demand functions of these product varieties.
Branded and generic varieties of the product are fundamentally identical but consumers perceive them as being vertically differentiated. Moreover, consumers perceive generic varieties produced by different firms as horizontally differentiated: the model assumes that consumers vary in their preferences over the differentiated generic pharmaceutical product. The market is then composed of a uniform mass of consumers distributed over a unidimensional space of product characteristics, defined by the interval [0, 1]. The disutility of consuming a generic product variety other than one's ideal variety is assumed to be linear in the distance along this Hotelling interval, with slope t > 0.
Let c i denote consumer i's type, where c i measures the distance between consumer i's location and the left endpoint of the unit interval. To reflect the existence of vertical differentiation between the branded good and the generic alternatives, we assume that a consumer's reservation price regarding the branded variety (β) is higher than her reservation price corresponding to a generic product (γ ). More formally, β > γ > 0. In addition, and a consequence of horizontal differentiation, if the consumer decides to buy a generic variety, her surplus depends negatively on the distance between her location and the location of the seller she is buying from in the generics product space, f j being firm j's location.
Consumers purchase either one unit of the drug or none. Each consumer opts for the variety that provides her the most surplus, as long as this surplus is positive.
Denoting by ( p b , p g , p pg ) the vector of prices, consumer c i 's individual surplus is given by:
Three additional remarks regarding our assumptions are in order at this point. First, on the demand side, that branded pharmaceuticals, which have been in the market for a considerable period under patent, may be perceived by consumers as being better than non-branded generics, in spite of health authorities claims to the contrary, we regard as obvious. In fact, there is evidence that even a considerable number of physicians see branded pharmaceuticals as more reliable than generics (Shrank et al. 2011) . But a crucial assumption of our model, that requires justification, is that generics may be perceived as horizontally differentiated. Even if they are "therapeutically equivalent" to the branded product, and thus also among themselves, generics may differ along many easily observable dimensions: ingredients other than the active substances may, and do, differ and characteristics such as flavour, shape, and color are usually different. Besides, packages and labels may vary significantly. Further, although they do not carry a product brand (the product will be described as "acetylsalicylic acid", not as "Aspirin", for example), they generally identify the producer (it will be acetylsalicylic acid by XYZpharma): there is no a priori reason to assume that consumers, or whoever chooses the product for them, are less sensitive to the identity of the producer in this type of product than in any other. Commenting on the generic market in Canada, Hollis (2002) notes that "there is a switching cost for the patient (discomfort with receiving a different medication) and therefore a switching cost for the pharmacist, who has to spend time consulting with the patient and assuring him that the difference between generics is insignificant, but that there is small possibility that the inactive ingredients in the new generic may cause a slightly different reaction (...)". On this regard, note that which generic variety the consumer buys is often strongly influenced by whichever are available at pharmacies. And pharmacies may well have preferences on which producer to buy from that will translate into transportation cost for consumers that prefer a different variety. Again quoting Hollis (2002) , "To minimize inventory costs, pharmacies typically carry only one generic form of a particular drug." Thus, we regard the assumption of horizontal differentiation among generics as a reasonable one.
Second, assuming that consumers have identical preferences for the branded drug while they are spread along a Hotelling line in terms of preferences for the generics may seem an ad hoc asymmetry in the model. But the situation is of itself asymmetric: there are two potential sellers of the generic but only one of the branded drug and we wish to model a situation in which this last product is unanimously perceived as better than any of the others. The model could deal with a richer set of circumstances, by having the degree of "superiority" of the branded drug depend on its own "location", but this would have a cost in terms of tractability that, we believe, would not be justified by additional insightfulness.
Finally, on the supply side, development and entry costs certainly play a fundamental role in pharmaceutical markets. However, as the purpose of this article is to illustrate a mechanism through which pseudo-generics can "soften" competition, not to study entry deterrence, we normalize costs to zero. This implies that we assume the incumbent and the entrant to be equally efficient: in specific cases, one or the other may be more efficient but, in general, ignoring development costs, we see no obvious reason to assume a difference.
The following two sections compare firms' profits and consumers' surplus in alternative situations.
The monopolistic benchmark case
Consider first the case in which the incumbent is a monopolist, possibly because she is protected by patents. This being the case, she may either sell only the branded variety of the product or both the branded and the (pseudo-)generic varieties. However, in this complete information setting, as the reservation price for generic varieties is lower than the reservation price for the branded variety (i.e., β > γ ) and their respective production costs are identical (and equal to zero), it never pays to sell a generic variety along with the branded product. The incumbent then sets a price p 1 b = β for the branded variety. As a consequence, every consumer buys this branded product, getting zero surplus, and the incumbent's profit equals 1 I = β.
Oligopolistic competition
Consider now the case of oligopolistic competition, say because the patents that protected the incumbent have expired and, as a result, she starts facing competition by an entrant.
In what follows, we assume that the entrant's (generic) variety of the product is located at the left endpoint of the generics' product space ( f E = 0)-the unit interval-and that, if it is available, the pseudo-generic is located at point f I along the (0, 1] segment. There are two different scenarios of interest, depending on whether the incumbent is present in the market with only one variety (the branded good) or with two varieties (the branded good and the pseudo-generic), which we discuss in turn.
The incumbent does not sell a pseudo-generic
Assume the incumbent sells only the branded variety and the entrant sells the generic variety. When this is the case, Fig. 1 illustrates the determination of the demand for each product variety, for given location and prices. This figure implicitly assumes that the generic variety is sufficiently cheaper than the branded product so as to have positive demand. Specifically, it assumes p b − p g > β − γ . The location of the "marginal consumer" c b .g , who is indifferent between varieties b and g, follows from With the total number of consumers equal to 1, the demand functions for each variety of the product are simply:
With no production costs, profit functions are B ( p b , p g ) = B( p b , p g ) p b and E ( p b , p g ) = G( p b , p g ) p g . Maximizing these with respect to p b and p g , one obtains the best-response functions:
Solving the system of best-response functions, we find the equilibrium prices:
From these, through the demand functions, equilibrium quantities follow:
As we normalize the total number of consumers to 1, these quantities may be interpreted as market shares. Equilibrium profits are:
Restrictions on parameter values For these results to hold, some restrictions must be imposed on parameter values. Basically, these assure that the branded variety is perceived as better than the generic, but not so much better that no one would buy the latter, and that the product is sufficiently valuable for everyone to be willing to buy it (market is fully covered under competition). Under these conditions, both varieties will be simultaneously sold at a profit. Figure 2 illustrates the necessary restrictions on β and γ , as a function of t. First, we require that a consumer who buys the branded variety gets non-negative surplus and thus prefers it to the outside option of not buying any of the varieties. To achieve this, let β ≥ p b . In equilibrium, this is equivalent to As any consumer may buy the branded variety, this is also a sufficient condition for the market to be covered. If this condition does not hold, then the incumbent will be unable to sell its product at the equilibrium price determined by Eq. 4a. To have non-negative sales, its price will be restricted to p b = β and the entrant will respond with p g = γ 2 . This in turn implies that profits will be I = β (1 − γ /2t) and E = γ 2 /4t. When condition (8) holds, for generic entry to be viable, the indifferent consumer must be located in the [0, 1] segment, i.e., 0 < c b .g < 1, as assumed. Simple algebra shows that the right-hand side condition c b .g < 1 always holds as t > 0 and β > γ . As for c b .g > 0, it must be that
If β exceeds the threshold value t + γ , the incumbent can raise its price above p 2 b without inducing the entrant to sell the generic. Specifically, the incumbent can then set a limit price of p b = β − γ and sell to the entire market, with a profit of b = β − γ . Summing up, the results in this section apply if conditions (8) and (9) hold. 3 Hence, the relevant region of parameter values is the one illustrated with the shaded area in Fig. 2 .
The incumbent sells a pseudo-generic
Consider now the case in which the incumbent, faced with generic competition by an entrant, sells also a non-branded version of her own product, which we call a pseudo-generic.
Assume the pseudo-generic is located sufficiently close to the entrant's generic product for some consumer to be indifferent between them: otherwise, there would be no strategic interaction between the two products and, therefore, no reason for the incumbent to sell the pseudo-generic. Denote by c g. pg the location of this consumer and by f I the location of the pseudo-generic variety in the generics product space. Assuming the pseudo-generic does not cannibalize the incumbent's whole market, there will also be some consumer c r b . pg that is indifferent between the pseudogeneric and the branded variety of the product. Here, the superscript r indicates that this consumer is located to the right of f I . We will later use the notation c l b . pg for the consumer that is indifferent between these varieties to the left of f I . The determination of the demand functions for the three varieties of the product is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Solving γ − p g − t × c g. pg = γ − p pg − t × f I − c g. pg , the location of the consumer indifferent between the two generic varieties of the product is 
, the location of the consumer indifferent between the two varieties sold by the incumbent is:
The demand functions are
Profit functions are then:
entrant's generic to the incumbent's branded variety. More formally, we require that 0 ≤ c b .g ≤ 1. The first inequality is equivalent to
The second inequality implies that
Next, to guarantee that some but not all consumers prefer the pseudo-generic to the entrant's variety, we require that c r b . pg > c b .g . In equilibrium, this is equivalent to
Note that, if this holds, any β > γ will satisfy Eq. 19. We also require that some but not all consumers prefer the branded variety of the product to the pseudo-generic, i.e., f I < c r b . pg < 1. The second inequality is trivially satisfied for any t > 0, β > γ and 0 < f I < 1. The first inequality, on the other hand, is equivalent to require that:
Note that this is more restrictive than Eq. 18. Our solution assumes also that the consumer who is indifferent between the two generic varieties does not prefer the branded variety. Otherwise, the incumbent would not sell the pseudo-generic. Thus, we require also that c b .g ≥ c l b . pg , which implies that:
It should be noted that, provided that Eq. 20 holds, condition (22) is more restrictive than either Eqs. 18 and 21. Compatibility between Eq. 22 and the assumption that β > γ , further requires that f I < 5 8 . We combine this with Eq. 20 and require that:
Summing up, the active restrictions are, thus, Eqs. 17, 22, and 23. Figure 4 summarizes the restrictions that apply to the demand parameters β and γ , for f I = 0.5 and a specific value of t.
Price and profit impact of the pseudo-generic
We now turn to the main results in the paper, where we determine the competitive impact due to the pseudo-generic introduction in an oligopolistic setting.
Proposition 1 For parameter values satisfying t > 0, β > γ > 0, and conditions (17), (22), and (23), the introduction of a pseudo-generic raises the price of both the branded and the true-generic varieties of the product.
With β > γ and t > 0, both conditions hold for any f I ∈ 2 5 , 5 8 .
The overall impact of the pseudo-generic on consumers does not depend on these two prices alone, though, as some of them will replace the pseudo-generic for the other varieties of the product. But that will be of no avail.
Proposition 2
For parameter values satisfying t > 0, β > γ > 0, and conditions (17), (22), and (23), the pseudo-generic is more expensive than either the branded product or the true generic would be in its absence.
These are less restrictive than condition (22), above, and so always true for the relevant range of parameter values.
As every price rises with the introduction of the pseudo-generic, we finally claim that Corollary 1 For the range of parameter values def ined by t > 0, β > γ > 0, and conditions (17), (22), and (23), the introduction of a pseudo-generic reduces consumers' surplus.
Thus, for certain parameter values, if the incumbent sells a pseudo-generic, consumers will be hurt. But we have yet to prove that the incumbent will want to sell the pseudo-generic.
Proposition 3
For parameter values satisfying t > 0, β > γ > 0, and conditions (17), (22), and (23), selling the pseudo-generic increases the incumbent's prof it.
Proof Let = 3 I − 2 I . Note that ∂ ∂ fI < 0, for values of f I satisfying Eq. 23. Thus, a lower bound for the profit variation that results from selling the pseudogeneric is given by l (t, θ) = lim fI → 5 8 − = 515 2304 t − 37 144 θ + 5 36t θ 2 , where θ = β − γ . As ∂ 2 l(t,θ) ∂θ 2 = 5 18t > 0, for any value of t in the relevant range, the solution to ∂l(t,θ) ∂θ = 0 corresponds to a minimum to that lower bound: this happens for θ = 37 40 t, which implies l = 67 640 t. This minimum is positive for any t > 0. Thus, for the parameter values defined above, selling the pseudo-generic increases the incumbent's profit.
The following numerical example illustrates our results. Assume t = 0.5, γ = 1 and β = 7 6 . Using the formulas above, it is immediate to find that, if the incumbent does not sell the pseudo-generic, equilibrium is characterized by price quantity profit branded product 0.388 0.777 0.302 generic 0.111 0.222 0.025
Assume, alternatively, that the incumbent sells a pseudo-generic located at f I = 0.5. Equilibrium values will then be: price quantity profit branded product 0.792 0.417 0.330 pseudo-generic 0.583 0.167 0.097 generic 0.417 0.417 0.174
Thus, every price rises, increasing both firms' profits at consumers' expenses. The intuition for these results can be understood by thinking of the impact that a price reduction by the incumbent will have on her market share. If she is not selling the pseudo-generic, the incumbent's branded product competes directly against the entrant's generic, as illustrated in Fig. 1: in , along Eq. 3b). But if the incumbent sells the pseudo-generic, this product interposes between the branded product and the "true"-generic, as seen in Fig. 3 : a reduction of the price of the branded product would steal consumers from its own pseudo-generic (i.e., it would move c r b . pg to the left) but would have no impact on the entrant's market share (c g. pg would remain the same and ∂G( pb , pg) ∂ pb = 0, along Eq. 12c). To steal market share from the entrant, the incumbent would now need to resort to the pseudo-generic price. But a unitary reduction of the price of the pseudo-generic steals just half as much market share from the entrant ( ∂G( pb , ppg, pg) ∂ ppg = 1 2t , along Eq. 12c) as a reduction of the price of the branded product would if the pseudo-generic was not available. This is because the two generics are horizontally differentiated and consumers trade off the reduced price against the higher "transportation costs". Thus, the incentive to reduce prices is weaker if the pseudo-generic is being sold. This is aggravated by two other factors. First, reducing the price of the pseudogeneric will not only capture consumers that would otherwise buy the true-generic but also others that would buy the incumbent's, more profitable, branded product (reducing the price of the pseudo-generic moves c r b . pg to the right). 4 Besides, in this model, as usual, prices are strategic complements: anticipating higher prices by the pseudo-generic selling incumbent, the entrant herself sets higher prices, further decreasing the incumbent's incentive to reduce prices. Thus, the presence of the pseudo-generic softens competition between the two firms.
Discussion and further research
This paper illustrates a new theoretical rationale for the fact that the introduction of pseudo-generics can lead to higher prices of all (branded and non-branded) varieties in the market and reduce consumer surplus. The key feature of the proposed model is the coexistence of both vertical and horizontal differentiation which we think is a good description of the way pharmaceutical products markets work in reality.
There are other contexts where this coexistence of two types of differentiation is at work and in which our model may prove insightful. A good example is the case in which branded products are sold in retail stores along with private labeled products (sometimes produced by the same firm which sells as well the main brand available in the market). The empirical literature shows that entry by store brands is often accompanied by price increases (Ward et al. 2002; Bonfrer and Chintagunta 2004) .
In concluding, it should be pointed out that an important limitation to the previous analysis is the fact that the location of the generic varieties in the product space are assumed to be exogenously given. Clearly, the assumption of exogenous "locations" restricts the applicability of the proposed model, as in real life industries product positioning and repositioning is another important dimension through which firms strategically interact. So, it seems important to extend the analysis in order to consider cases in which locations are endogenously determined. This will be done in future research. Hopefully, the above model can be seen as a stepping stone in the direction of a more complete analysis.
